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DOI 10.1016/j.neuron.2010.03.015The last decade has seen a dramatic rise
of interest in the study of social neurosci-
ence. Two observations have had a major
role in driving this interest. First, there was
the discovery that autism is associated
with specific difficulties in social cogni-
tion, while nonsocial cognition, and in
particular IQ, can remain intact (Frith,
1989; Hermelin and O’Connor, 1970).
This discovery was made during the time
when the information-processing revolu-
tion was transforming the behavioral
sciences and when researchers were
striving to find mechanisms underlying
behavior, a significant departure from a
preoccupation with surface appearances.
This change of approach led to the pro-
posal of a mechanism that could explain
some of the characteristic social impair-
ments of autism, a lack of Theory of
Mind, or inability to mentalize (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985). The case of autism
lent weight to the idea that there is a cir-
cumscribed brain system associated
with social cognition: the social brain.
The mentalizing deficit hypothesis en-
couraged the search for underlying neural
mechanisms and posed the question of
whether this was unique to the human
brain.
A second impetus for the increase in
research in social neuroscience came
from the discovery of mirror neurons in
the monkey. These neurons fire both
when the monkey performs a specific
goal-directed action and also when the
monkey sees the experimenter perform-
ing the same goal-directed action (Rizzo-
latti et al., 1996). This observation reveals
that there is amechanismwithin the social
brain with the potential to enable learning
through imitation and to infer intentions
from action observation. Researcherswere thus encouraged to try and specify
such mechanisms (e.g., Kilner et al.,
2007) in animals, including humans,where
learning from conspecifics by imitation,
emulation, or mimicry is pervasive.
The contributors to this special issue on
social neuroscience review the research
of the last decade and reveal how very
much more there is to social cognition
and that these earlier discoveries were
only the beginnings of a vast enterprise.
This enterprise, at least at first glance,
focuses on learning from others. This
kind of social behavior can be observed
in animals from fruit flies to humans. The
mechanisms underlying this behavior are
beginning to be revealed at the molecular
level. In addition to the wide range of
animal species considered in this special
review issue, a wide range of approaches
and interpretations are applied to the
observations. In this overview we will
present our own ideas for drawing to-
gether this exciting work. There are three
key issues to be discussed. First, there
is the problem of how to bridge the gap
between genes and neurons on one side
and social behavior on the other, which
in the case of humans includes a vast
array of historically enduring accomplish-
ments, including the existence of cultural
institutions. Second, there is the problem
of the distinction between social and
nonsocial cognition. Third, there is the
problem of determining what is special,
if anything, about human social cognition.
Let us start with the gap between mole-
cules and behavior. As is revealed in the
exhaustive review by Ebstein et al.
(2010), many unique aspects of human
social behavior are, at least partially,
under genetic control, and here remark-
able work is being done at the molecularNeuron 6level. However, this work is far removed
from explaining, say, cultural learning. It
is even far removed from explaining the
processes by which genetic factors exert
control on individual differences in social
behavior. Twin studies show that there
are complex interactions with nongenetic
influences, and the study of epigenetic
effects is thriving. One example of an
epigenetic effect on social behavior is
seen in honey bees: When worker bees
feed larvae with royal jelly, the expression
of genes involved in growth and metabo-
lism is changed, and this leads to the
development of new queens (Sokolowski,
2010).
Examples of behavior under partial
genetic control mentioned by Ebstein
et al. (2010) and Insel (2010) include
economic decision making and political
attitudes. Such behaviors were previously
considered as typically human achieve-
ments, culturally prescribed and precari-
ously taught with little if any connection
to our biological nature. Now we can con-
template a genetic predisposition that
biases you to vote for one political party
rather than another and a predisposition
for you to make more or less altruistic
decisions. However, exciting as the idea
is that proclivities in social behavior have
a genetic basis, it is plainly not sufficient
to explain social behavior. As Sokolowski
(2010) points out, genes don’t determine
behavior; they encode molecules that
build brain tissue. When we try to under-
stand empathy or political attitudes, we
need to know how these concepts are
linked to basic mechanisms, what con-
trols them and what doesn’t, how to
explain their origin in development, and
how to account for their elaboration
through culture.5, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 739
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Figure 1. A Simple Conceptualization of Different
Levels of Explanation in Comparative Social
Neuroscience
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OverviewThe Mediating Role of the
Cognitive Level of Description
We were fascinated to learn from this
special review issue of the extent to
which the same social processes
can be observed in so many different
species. This tells us that, at some
level, which we call the cognitive level,
evolution has led to homologous solu-
tions dealing with the problems and
advantages that arise from living with
conspecifics.
Figures 1 and 2 are simple illustra-
tions of how to conceptualize a cog-
nitive level of description and how it
fits with the whole enterprise of social
neuroscience (diagrams adaptedfrom Morton and Frith, 1995).
We see in these figures that cognition is
situated in between brain and behavior,
and by virtue of this position forms a link
between these two rather distinct levels
of explanation. This is important because
there is no one-to-one mapping when
crossing levels. For example, as Figure 2
shows, at the biological level we can allow
for a variety of genetic pathways and
mechanisms. These pathways lead to
the development and maintenance of dis-
tinct parts of the central nervous system.
Different mechanisms can be modeled,
as here in terms of multiple neural net-
works underlying the cognitive process
termed mentalizing, which can be as-
sessed by such diverse behaviors as joint
attention, deception, and ostensive com-
munication (Frith et al., 1991).
The critical question is what do the bio-
logical roots allow the mind to do? We
imagine there is some parsimony, so
that we allow for a many-to-one mapping
from biology to cognition. On the other
hand, we allow for a one-to-many map-
ping from cognition to behavior. We can
assume that a single mental mechanism
(often in interaction with other mecha-
nisms) can be responsible for a large
variety of behaviors. For example, the
ability to learn language (Fitch et al.,
2010) has different manifestations in
different species and can be assessed
with different tests at both the neural
and behavioral level.
While vocalization appears to be crucial
for the development of language and
communication, we are still only guessing
what other neurocognitive mechanisms
are being enabled or changed by evolu-740 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevtionary pressures on social behavior.
Mentalizing and the corepresentation of
action and observation are two very
recent examples of such mechanisms,
which had hardly been envisaged earlier.
The search for neural systems underlying
these mechanisms has been remarkably
successful, while the search for the
genetic foundations for the origin of our
ability to learn language has been nothing
less than a triumph (Fitch et al., 2010).
For now, however, we need to accept
that there are huge gaps between brain
and mind and behavior in almost any of
the social behaviors and almost any of
the biological mechanisms discussed
by the present reviewers.
In the papers in this issue, there are a
number of concepts that describe acogni-
tivemechanism, even if not explicitly clas-
sified as such by the author. Insel (2010)
describes some of the links between
genes and brain systems in his discussion
of the role of oxytocin, but recognizes
the problem of‘‘the great dark matter of
social neuroscience’’that lies between
perception and action. Adolphs (2010)
also recognizes this problem and
suggests that‘‘analysis at the level of the
brain could serve as a unifying base.’’
However, this aim will be difficult to fulfill
in light of the idea that there are homologs
of social capacities in species with very
different brains. Animals, such as birds,
cetaceans, and mammals, possessing
very different brain structures, can never-
theless all be said to have some under-
standing of the point of view of others,
including possibly their mental states.
Furthermore, evidence of learning from
the observation of conspecifics can beier Inc.found from fruit flies to humans. There
are, however, considerable variations
in the sophistication of this learning.
The cognitive level makes it simple
to accommodate the possibility that
a variety of neural mechanisms can
all underpin critical processes that
allow learning from others. At this
level, mental processes, whether in-
stantiated in the bird brain, the
monkey brain, or the human brain,
can be understood to serve the
same aims. For example, all these
creatures send out signals of commu-
nication and modulate their behavior
in the presence of conspecifics. We
believe that the cognitive level canbe developed to fill the gap between basic
molecular processes and intuitively per-
ceived social abilities, since the vocabu-
lary of cognition, and in particular the
computational models associated with
this level, can be applied equally to neural
as to mental processes.
We note that we are using the term
cognitive in its modern sense. We are
not using cognition in the restricted sense
of knowledge as opposed to emotion or
will. We are certainly not using cognition
in the sense of conscious processes. We
are using it as in‘‘cognitive neurosci-
ence’’; a mechanistic account of neural
and psychological processes using terms
derived from computational theory. Such
terminology can be found in many of the
contributions to this review issue. For
example, Insel (2010) talks of the ‘‘brain
employing specific receptors for the pro-
cessing of social information.’’ Byrne
and Bates (2010) talk of ‘‘representing
unobservable causal factors.’’ Analysis
at the cognitive level permits recognition
that the same sensory signals can be pro-
cessed in different ways. For example, if
some species are not able to form the
same mental representations, then what
they do with the same information may
be radically different (Byrne et al., 2004).
Such recognition is critical when we start
comparing different species.
Learning by Observation
Learning from others is the most basic
definition of social cognition that charac-
terizes all social species. However, we
can learn from others and about others
in ways that do not qualify as implicating
social processes at all. Very clear
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Figure 2. A Simple Example of Conceptualizing the Putative
Cognitive Mechanism‘‘Mentalizing’’or Theory of Mind as a Node that
Accommodates Both Many-to-One and One-to-Many Mapping
between Different Levels of Explanation
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learning come from examples
where we can infer that an
agent’s reputation is at stake.
For example, an agent may
give a signal to another agent
when this signal exposes him
and might well endanger his
life. This is often used to
advertise prowess in mating
rituals. Such a signal means
a lot, as it tells the recipient
that the signaler is an honest
agent. If the signal was a
fake, as in crying wolf, then
the long-term reputation of
the signaler will be damaged.
In these cases, we can talk of
a cognitive process that isdeeply engaged in the social cooperation
and competition typical of group living.
Fake signals and true but costly signals
occur in many different species, and the
response to these signals seems auto-
matic (Maynard Smith and Harper, 2003).
As soon as we address long-term repu-
tation, a central aspect of social cognition
likely to depend on mentalizing ability, it is
clear that other cognitive processes are
required for this sophisticated social
ability to flourish. One particularly critical
prerequisite is the ability to distinguish
between individuals. Memory for who
did what and when is of central impor-
tance in social living. We must assume
that the recognition of conspecifics, by
whatever sense, is a prerequisite for the
aim of influencing the opinion of others.
This prerequisite need not be seen as a
specifically social mechanism, but may
equally serve as a prerequisite for epi-
sodic memory in general problem solving.
As noted by Insel (2010), some sensory
information is primarily encoded as social,
and there is multimodal sensitivity to the
perception of others (Fitch et al., 2010).
One of the key research questions is
how do we know what to attend to and
when? Social stimuli such as eye gaze
and the face are highly compelling and
have attracted much research interest.
Studies of gaze following in different
species allow us to see sharp divisions
between geometric line of sight following
and following gaze beyond the line of
sight, even when there is an occluder.
This type of gaze following relies on a
special cognitive mechanism that allowsthe automatic inference of intention and
desires (Fitch et al., 2010). Joint attention
may go a step further by involving infer-
ence of knowledge and beliefs. If so, it
can be seen as a basis for ostensive
communication and natural pedagogy
(Gergely et al., 2007). When speaker and
listener interact truly reciprocally, as in
intuitive teaching and learning, we can
assume that there is a‘‘closing of the
loop’’so that both participants in the inter-
action end up by adjusting their minds to
each other (Frith, 2007). We will return
later to the importance of this capacity
as a primary vehicle for cultural evolution.
Social and Nonsocial Cognition
As we noted at the beginning, a division
between social and nonsocial cognition
fits with observations from autism. It also
fits with observations from patients with
brain lesions, with the proviso that the
age at which a lesion is sustained may
critically determine the extent to which
social cognition is impaired (Blakemore,
2010). Adolphs (2010) argues that social
cognition recruits processes for which
there is no analog in nonsocial cognition,
quoting examples that invoke the brain’s
mirror system, such as empathy and
contagion by others’ emotions, and
reminds us of our ubiquitous tendency to
anthropomorphize, which extends even
to agents that are not biological entities.
Sokolowski (2010) concludes that all
social species need social interaction for
normal development. Blakemore (2010)
reviews evidence that language learning
in children requires interaction with realNeuron 65, March 25,people rather than videos.
This phenomenon is also
seen in some birds who will
only learn their songs from a
living tutor (Fitch et al.,
2010). As Byrne and Bates
(2010) point out, the set of
cognitive skills shown by a
population will depend upon
opportunities for social
learning.
The learning of songs by
birds (Fitch et al., 2010) is a
particularly interesting case
because the molecular and
cognitive mechanisms are
beginning to be understood.
Such learning depends upon
auditory mirror neurons andseems to be under the control of the
FOXP2 gene. A critical requirement of
this learning may be precise control of
the vocal apparatus through direct con-
nections from the avian equivalents of
cortex to primary motor neurons in the
brain stem. The parallels with the human
speech system are striking (Ju¨rgens,
2002). In this context, it is interesting to
note a recent suggestion (Hamilton, 2008)
that the possibly uniquely human ability
to imitate non-goal-directed actions
(mimicry) might also depend upon unique
direct connections between relevant
cortical regions.
However, is nonsocial cognition really
distinct from social cognition? While it
seems attractive to suppose that the
requirement of living in social groups has
shaped every mental function, Byrne and
Bates (2010) point out that pressure from
within social groups is not the only force
driving the evolution of cognition. There
is also the problem of predicting what
happens in the physical environment as
well as in the biological environment.
Which lake is about to dry up? Which fruit
is about to ripen? There is also pressure to
understand the behavior of other species.
What is the predator or prey going to do
next? As these examples show, activities
outside the social domain often revolve
around obtaining and processing food,
something in which great apes are espe-
cially sophisticated. However, even the
food-processing skills of great apes
have a social component, since these
new skills are learned by observation of
conspecifics.2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 741
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nonsocial cognition perhaps illusory?
This difficulty of distinguishing social and
nonsocial mechanisms certainly applies
to insects. Natural variation in the foraging
gene (for) in the common fruit fly results
in flies with different food-related behavior
called rovers or sitters (Sokolowski, 2010).
When food is distributed in patches,
rovers have a greater tendency than
sitters to leave the foodpatch. This dimen-
sion of behavior bears a striking resem-
blance to the explore-exploit dimension,
which has an important role in the habit
learning of humans and other mammals
and for whichwe now have computational
models (Daw et al., 2006). In both humans
and flies, the cognitive processes under-
lying this behavioral dimension would be
considered not primarily social. In ants
and bees, the for gene has the same role
in manipulating sitter or rover behavior.
However, this is now a social role, since
the gene regulates the relative number of
nurses or foragers in a colony.
We should, perhaps, not be surprised
that cognitive processes that have
evolved for nonsocial purposes can
readily be co-opted for social purposes
by natural selection. Evolution will always
make use of what is already available.
Traditionally, functions such as attention
and memory were studied by cognitive
psychologist outside the social domain,
but they also have a critical role in social
cognition. One of the cognitive functions
that has been recognized in this way is
regulation of behavior (Adolphs, 2010).
Modulation or suppression of automatic
behavior is often seen in the presence of
conspecifics. One only needs to think of
the child who resists taking a bite from
a cake as long as an adult is present, or
the cleaner fishwho resists the temptation
to bite a client fish when observed by
other potential clients (Bshary and Grut-
ter, 2006). The modulation of behavior
through nonsocial rewards is well-studied
in classic learning experiments, but, more
recently, there has been a consensus that
social and nonsocial rewards are a
common currency and subject to the
same principles of learning. Nevertheless,
a study (Behrens et al., 2008) suggests
that a division between social learning
and object learning is valid. This study
showed that individuals use different
neural substrates when they learn to742 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevassociate an object with a reward as
opposed to learning how trustworthy an
individual is who tells them which object
is the right one to choose. However, the
basic computations instantiated in these
different neural substrates were essen-
tially the same.
What Is Special about Human Social
Cognition?
There are many ways in which human
behavior and human society are special
(Northoff, 2010). The most obvious
special features are language, cumulative
culture, and the tendency to ask difficult
questions, such as what is special about
human social cognition? But this last
question, which concerns the processes
that underlie human behavior, is indeed
very difficult to answer. Many processes
have been put forward as special. The
ability to walk upright, to speak, or to
make tools have been proposed for
centuries. More recently, more sophisti-
cated abilities have taken center stage,
for instance, the ability to have episodic
memory, the ability to represent things
not actually present, and the ability to
represent the mental states of others.
But over the last decade, many of these
processes have been observed in other
primates and also in dogs and birds (Fitch
et al., 2010). For example, the recognition
that what agents know depends upon
what they can see would seem to depend
upon representing the mental state of
another and is, at least, precursor of
theory of mind. But there is now evidence
that apes, monkeys, scrub jays, and
ravens all have this ability. Even such
treasured human faculties as empathy,
fairness, and morality, all of which may
to some extent require the ability to repre-
sent others’ mental states, are present in
rudimentary forms in other animals (e.g.,
Brosnan and De Waal, 2003; Langford
et al., 2006).
Even more striking are demonstrations
of the ability to convey information about
objects that are not currently present.
This can be achieved by ravens, who,
having found a carcass to scavenge, will
recruit conspecifics to join the feast and
drive off competitors (Fitch et al., 2010).
Bees show the same ability: a swarm
makes a group decision about where to
locate a new hive. This is done by forager
bees indicating by their dance the locationier Inc.and desirability of the site they have
found. It is through competition between
the different messengers that the swarm,
after many hours, chooses one of these
sites and travels to it (Sokolowski, 2010).
Perhaps, as Adolphs (2010) suggests,
the difference is quantitative rather than
qualitative: humans have more flexible
top-down control and are more able to
handle delayed rewards (temporal dis-
counting in the language of neuroeco-
nomics) and thus, for example, are able
to develop reciprocal altruism in social
interactions.
Nevertheless, humans have been such
a successful species with a vital need for
social interaction that we would still
hope that it might be possible to identify
a special form of human social cognition.
Although other species may show precur-
sors of processes like mentalizing, their
abilities are so rudimentary compared to
humans that some sort of qualitative
leap seems likely to have occurred. Of
course, one possibility is that the basic
cognitive abilities of humans are not
more advanced than other species, but
that a small difference in mental capacity
was sufficient for a gulf between humans
and others to emerge very slowly as a
result of the cumulative effects of culture
(Tomasello, 1999).
We have two suggestions as to what
the special feature of human social cogni-
tion might be. One idea is that humans
have an automatic (unconscious) drive to
constantly update the difference between
their own knowledge and the knowledge
of specific others. Such a tendency is
critical to the human drive to share novel
information with others (Fitch et al., 2010).
Such sharing, and indeed any useful
communication, depends on knowing
what other people don’t know.
The other idea is that much human
knowledge is represented in the explicit
(conscious) form that is needed for
sharing experiences. In other words, there
is a special form of human communica-
tion where we are aware that we are
sending and receiving signals (Sperber
and Wilson, 1995). This means that,
when we receive a signal we make a
distinction (among other distinctions)
between unintentional and deliberate
signaling. We know that unintentional
signals may have more veracity than
deliberate signals because deliberate
Neuron
Overviewsignals can be manipulated by the sender
for the purposes of deception. On the
other hand, we can use deliberate signals
of communication to teach others. Both
informal and formal teaching are the
building materials of culture and serve to
multiply learning from others (Gergely
et al., 2007). This multiplication of experi-
ence over many generations may be the
secret to the success of Homo sapiens.
Many would agree that it is the ability to
reflect on what we, and others, are doing
and why we are doing it that makes us
unique. No doubt, this ability to reflect
has in turn also led to the ability to predict
the future better than any other species;
whether for good or for ill remains to be
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